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Abstract
This essay is the introduction for a collection of papers by the two of us on ￿Robust Mech-
anism Design￿to be published by World Scienti￿c Publishing. The appendix of this essay lists
the chapters of the book.
The objective of this introductory essay is to provide the reader with an overview of the
research agenda pursued in the collected papers. The introduction selectively presents the main
results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and
canonical example, the single unit auction with interdependent values.
In addition, we include an extended discussion about the role of alternative assumptions
about type spaces in our work and the literature, in order to explain the common logic of the
informational robustness approach that uni￿es the work in this volume.
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1 Introduction
This volume brings together a number of contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design
and robust implementation that we have been working on in the past decade. This work examines
the implications of relaxing the strong informational assumptions that drive much of the mechanism
design literature. It collects joint work of the two of us with each other and with coauthors Hanming
Fang, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn, Karl Schlag and Olivier Tercieux. We view our work with these co-
authors as thematically closely linked to the work of the two of us included in this volume.
The objective of this introductory essay is to provide the reader with an overview of the research
agenda pursued in the collected papers. The introduction selectively presents the main results of
the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example,
the single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example
facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of
an important economic mechanism, the generalized second price auction. In addition, we include
an extended discussion about the role of alternative assumptions about type spaces in our work
and the literature, in order to explain the common logic of the informational robustness approach
that uni￿es the work in this volume.
The mechanism design literature of the last thirty years has been a huge success on a number
of di⁄erent levels. There is a beautiful theoretical literature that has shown how a wide range of
institutional design questions can be formally posed as mechanism design problems with a common
structure. Elegant characterizations of optimal mechanisms have been obtained. Market design
has become more important in many economic arenas, both because of new insights from theory
and developments in information and computing technologies, which enable the implementation of
large scale trading mechanisms. A very successful econometric literature has tested auction theory
in practise.
However, there has been an unfortunate disconnect between the general theory and the applica-
tions/empirical work: mechanisms that work in theory or are optimal in some class of mechanisms
often turn out to be too complicated to be used in practise. Practitioners have then often been led
to argue in favor of using simpler but apparently sub-optimal mechanisms. It has been argued that
the optimal mechanisms are not "robust" - i.e., they are too sensitive to ￿ne details of the speci￿ed
environment that will not be available to the designer in practise. These concerns were present
at the creation of the theory and continue to be widespread today.1 In response to the concerns,
1Hurwicz (1972) discussed the need for ￿non-parametric￿mechanisms wich are independent of the distributional
2researchers have developed many attractive and in￿ uential results by imposing (in a somewhat ad
hoc way) stronger solution concepts and/or simpler mechanisms motivated by robustness consid-
erations. Our starting point is the in￿ uential concern of Wilson (1987) regarding the robustness of
the game theoretic analysis to the common knowledge assumptions:
￿Game theory has a great advantage in explicitly analyzing the consequences of trad-
ing rules that presumably are really common knowledge; it is de￿cient to the extent it
assumes other features to be common knowledge, such as one agent￿ s probability assess-
ment about another￿ s preferences or information. I foresee the progress of game theory
as depending on successive reductions in the base of common knowledge required to
conduct useful analyses of practical problems. Only by repeated weakening of common
knowledge assumptions will the theory approximate reality.￿
Wilson emphasized that as analysts we are tempted to assume that too much information is
common knowledge among the agents, and suggested that more robust conclusions would arise
if researchers were able to relax those common knowledge assumptions. Harsanyi (1967-68) had
the original insight that relaxing common knowledge assumptions is equivalent to working with a
type space which is larger if there is less common knowledge. A natural theoretical question then
is to ask whether it is possible to explicitly model the robustness considerations in such a way
that stronger solution concepts and/or simpler mechanisms emerge endogenously. In other words,
if the optimal solution to the planner￿ s problem is too complicated or too sensitive to be used
in practice, it is presumably because the original description of the planner￿ s problem was itself
￿ awed. We would like to investigate if improved modelling of the planner￿ s problem endogenously
generates the ￿robust￿features of mechanisms that researchers have been tempted to assume. Our
research agenda in robust mechanism design is therefore to ￿rst make explicit the implicit common
knowledge assumptions and then second to weaken them.
Thus, formally, our approach suggests asking what happens to the conventional insights in
the theory of mechanism design when confronted with larger and richer type spaces with weaker
requirements regarding the common knowledge of between the designer and the agents. In this
assumptions regarding the willingness-to-pay of the agents. Wilson (1985) states that trading rules should be ￿belief-
free￿by requiring that they ￿should not rely on features of the agents￿common knowledge, such as their probability
assessments.￿Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) seek ￿detail-free￿auction rules ￿that are independent of the details - such
as functional forms or distribution of signals - of any particular application and that work will in a broad range of
circumstances."
3respect, a very important contribution is due to Neeman (2004) who showed that the small type
space assumption is of special importance for the full surplus extraction results, as in Myerson (1981)
and Cremer and McLean (1988). In particular, he showed that the full surplus extraction results
fail to hold if agents￿private information doesn￿ t display a one-to-one relationship between each
agent￿ s beliefs about the other agents and his preferences (valuation). The extended dimensionality
relative to the standard model essentially allows for a richer set of higher order beliefs.
Similarly, the analysis of the ￿rst price auction in chapter 8 (by Hanming Fang and Morris) looks
at the role of richer type spaces by allowing private values but multidimensional types. There, each
bidder observes his own private valuation and a noisy signal of his opponent￿ s private valuation.
This model of private information stands in stark contrast to the standard analysis of auctions
with private values, where each agent￿ s belief about his competitor is simply assumed to coincide
with the common prior. In the presence of the multidimensional private signal, it is established
in chapter 8 that the celebrated revenue equivalence result between the ￿rst and the second price
auction fails to hold. With the richer type space, it is not even possible to rank the auction format
with respect to their expected revenue.
2 Leading Example:
Allocating a Private Good with Interdependent Values
It is the objective of this introduction to present the main themes and results of our research on
robust mechanism design through a prominent example, namely the e¢ cient allocation of a single
object among a group of agents. We are considering the following classic single good allocation
problem with interdependent values. There are I agents. Each agent i has a "payo⁄ type" ￿i 2
￿i = [0;1]. Write ￿ = ￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿I. Each agent i has a quasi-linear utility function and attaches
monetary value vi : ￿ ! R to getting the object, where the valuation function vi has the following
linear form:




The parameter ￿ is a measure of the interdependence in the valuations. If ￿ = 0, then we have the
classic private values case. If ￿ > 0, we have positive interdependence in values, if ￿ < 0, we have
negative interdependence. If ￿ = 1, then we have a model of common values.
In this setting, a social choice function must specify the allocation of the object and the (ex-
pected) payments that agents make as a function of the payo⁄ type pro￿le. Thus a social choice
4function f can be written as f (￿) = (q (￿);y (￿)) where the allocation rule determines the prob-
ability qi (￿) that agent i gets the object if the type pro￿le is ￿, with q (￿) = (q1 (￿);::::;qI (￿));
and transfer function, y (￿) = (y1 (￿);:::;yI (￿)), where yi (￿) determines the payment that agent i
makes to the planner.
If ￿ < 1, then the socially e¢ cient allocation is to give the object to an agent with the highest







#fj:￿j￿￿k for all kg; if ￿i ￿ ￿k for all k;
0; otherwise;
The speci￿c form of the tie-breaking rule, here simply assumed to be uniform by construction of
q￿
i (￿), is without importance. If ￿ = 1, there are common values and all allocations are e¢ cient, but
the above q￿ continues to form an e¢ cient allocation rule. While the papers in this volume deal with
general allocation problems - and in particular, are not restricted to quasi-linear environments -
this introduction will survey our results using this example and focussing on this e¢ cient allocation
rule.
Now let us consider mechanisms for allocating the object. Suppose for the moment that we were
in a private value environment, i.e., ￿ = 0. Then a well-known mechanism to achieve the e¢ cient
allocation is the second price sealed bid auction. Here, each player i announces a "bid" bi 2 [0;1],
and the object is allocated to the highest bidder who pays the second highest bid. Each agent has a
dominant strategy to bid his true payo⁄ type ￿i and the object is allocated e¢ ciently. The second
price sealed bid mechanism is a speci￿c instance of a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism which are
known to achieve e¢ ciency and incentive compatibility in dominant strategies for a large class of
allocation problems in private value environments with quasi-linear utility.
Maskin (1992) introduced a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
to an environment with interdependent values. With interdependence, that is for ￿ 6= 0, the
￿generalized￿Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism asks each agent i to report, or ￿bid￿bi 2 [0;1],
but now the rule of the ￿generalized￿second price sealed bid auction is that agent i with the highest













We observe that if ￿ = 0, then the payment rule of the ￿generalized￿second price sealed bid auction
reduces to the familiar rule of the second price sealed bid auction. If agents bid "truthfully," setting
5their bid bi equal to their payo⁄ type ￿i, then the generalized second price auction leads to the
realization of the social choice function f￿ (￿) = (q￿ (￿);y￿ (￿)).
As long as parameter of interdependence is ￿ ￿ 1, ensuring that a single crossing property is
satis￿ed, this social choice function is "ex post incentive compatible". That is, if an agent expected
other agents to report their types truthfully, he has an incentive to report his type truthfully.

















This expression is greater than 0 if ￿i > maxj6=i f￿jg and less than 0 if ￿i < maxj6=i f￿jg.
We observe that the winning bidder cannot a⁄ect the transfer through this report; this is the
VCG aspect of the generalized second price auction. Now if his payo⁄type is larger than the payo⁄
type of everybody else, he would like to win the object, and thus he cannot do better than bid
his true value. On the other hand, if agent i￿ s payo⁄ type is lower than the highest payo⁄ type
among the remaining bidders, then he would have to report a higher type to receive object, but
as ￿i < maxj6=i f￿jg, the resulting net utility for bidder i would be negative. If ￿i = maxj6=i f￿jg,
the agent would be indi⁄erent between winning the object or not. We have thus established that
the e¢ cient allocation is implemented with ex post incentive compatibility conditions. Thus the
generalized second price auction ensured that, for all beliefs and higher order beliefs, there is an
equilibrium that leads to the e¢ cient allocation.
This mechanism is "robust" in the sense that as long as there is common knowledge of the
environment and payo⁄s as we described them, there will be an equilibrium where the e¢ cient
allocation rule is followed whatever the beliefs and higher order beliefs of the agents about the
payo⁄ types of the other agents. Ex post incentive compatibility is clearly su¢ cient for "partial
robust implementation," i.e., the existence of a mechanism with the property that, whatever agents￿
beliefs and higher order beliefs, there is an equilibrium giving rise to the e¢ cient allocation. In
chapter 1, we study when the existence of an ex post incentive compatible direct mechanism is
necessary for partial robust implementation. But formalizing this question is delicate, and has
been the subject of some confusion in the literature. In the next section, we will discuss how the
language of type spaces can be used to formalize this and other questions and to highlight some
subtleties in the formalization.
63 Type Spaces
We will be interested in situations where there is common knowledge of the structure of the en-
vironment described in the previous section, but the planner may not know much about each
agent￿ s beliefs or higher order beliefs about other agents￿types. Thus rather than making the usual
"Bayesian" assumption that the planner knows some true common prior over ￿ = ￿1 ￿ ￿￿￿ ￿ ￿I,
we want to be able to capture the planner￿ s uncertainty about agents￿types, and what each agent
believes about other agents￿types, by allowing richer type spaces.
It is important to study type spaces that are richer than ￿, because we want to allow for the
possibility that two types of an agent may be identical from a payo⁄ type perspective, but have
di⁄erent beliefs about, say, the payo⁄ types of other agents. In addition, we want to allow for
interim type spaces, where there are no restrictions on a type￿ s interim belief about other agents￿
types. Requiring that types￿interim beliefs be derived from some prior probability distribution on
the type space, in other words that the type space constitutes a common prior type space, will
then represent an important special case. In what follows, we will focus on ￿nite type spaces but
our results readily extend to in￿nite type spaces and some of the chapters in this book explicitly
consider such in￿nite type spaces.
Agent i￿ s type is ti 2 Ti. A type of agent i must include a description of his payo⁄ type. Thus
there is a function
b ￿i : Ti ! ￿i,
with b ￿i (ti) being agent i￿ s payo⁄ type when his type is ti. A type of agent i must also include
a description of his beliefs about the types of the other agents. Writing ￿(Z) for the space of
probability distributions on Z, there is a function
b ￿i : Ti ! ￿(T￿i),
with b ￿i (ti) being agent i￿ s belief type when his type is ti. Thus b ￿i (ti)[E] is the probability that
type ti of agent i assigns to other agents￿types, t￿i, being an element of E ￿ T￿i. We will abuse
notation slightly by writing b ￿i (ti)[t￿i] for the probability that type ti of agent i assigns to other







The standard approach in the mechanism design literature is to assume a common knowledge
prior, p 2 ￿(￿), on the set of payo⁄ types ￿. This standard approach can be modelled in our
7language by identifying the set of types Ti with the payo⁄ types ￿i and de￿ning beliefs by










It is useful to distinguish two distinct, critical and strong, assumptions embedded in the standard
approach. First, it is assumed that there is a unique belief type associated with each payo⁄ type.
More precisely, we will say that a type space T is a payo⁄ type space if each b ￿i is a bijection, so
that the set of possible types is identi￿ed with the set of payo⁄ types. While often motivated by
analytic convenience, when maintained in particular applications, this assumption is often strong
and unjusti￿ed. This assumption need not be paired with the common prior assumption, but it
often is. Type space T is a common prior type space if there exists ￿ 2 ￿(T) such that
X
t￿i2T￿i
￿ (ti;t￿i) > 0 for all i and ti;
and










Thus the standard approach consists of requiring both that T is a payo⁄ type space and that T
is a common prior type space. We can think of this as the smallest type space that is used in the
Bayesian analysis that embeds the payo⁄ environment described above. The standard approach
makes strong common knowledge assumptions of the type that Wilson (1987) and others have
argued should be expunged from mechanism design. For example, a well known implication of the
standard approach is that if the common prior p is picked generically (under Lebesgue measure), the
seller is able to fully extract the agents￿surplus (Myerson (1981) and Cremer and McLean (1988)).
While the insight that correlation in agents￿types can be exploited seems to be an economically
important one, it is clear that full surplus extraction is not something which can be carried out in
practise. While a number of assumptions underlying the model of full surplus extraction,2 Neeman
(2004) highlights the role of the implausible assumption that "beliefs determine preferences" (BDP),
i.e., that there is a common knowledge of a mapping that identi￿es a unique possible valuation
associated with any given belief over others￿types. The innocuous looking "genericity" assumption
obtains its bite by being combined with the strong common knowledge assumptions entailed by the
payo⁄ type space restriction.
2Robert (1991), La⁄ont and Martimort (2000) and Peters (2001) highlight the importance of risk neutrality and
unlimitied liability, absence of collusion and absence of competition, respectively.
8To illustrate the role of richer types spaces, let us consider an example from chapter 8, Fang and
Morris (2006). Suppose there are two agents whose valuations of the object are either low (vl) or
high (vh), with each valuation equally likely. In addition, each agent observes a low (l) or high (h)
signal which re￿ ects the other agent￿ s valuation with probability q ￿ 1
2. This situation is modelled
in the language of this essay by setting I = 2; ￿i = fvl;vhg; Ti = fvl;vhg ￿ fl;lg; b ￿i (￿i;si) = ￿i;
writing sj ’ ￿i if (￿i;sj) = (vl;l) or (vh;h),
b ￿i ((￿i;si))[(￿j;sj)] =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
q2, if si ’ ￿j and sj ’ ￿i;
q (1 ￿ q), if si ’ ￿j but not sj ’ ￿i;
q (1 ￿ q), if sj ’ ￿i but not si ’ ￿j;
(1 ￿ q)
2 , if neither si ’ ￿j nor sj ’ ￿i:
In this type space, there are independent private values as represented by the payo⁄types, but there
are multidimensional types. The BDP property ("beliefs determine preferences") fails because an
agent￿ s beliefs about others￿types depend only on his signal and thus reveal no information about
his valuation.
At the other extreme from the payo⁄ type space is the largest type space embedding the payo⁄
relevant environment described above which places no restrictions on agents￿beliefs or higher order
beliefs about other agents￿payo⁄ types, allowing for any beliefs and higher order beliefs about
payo⁄types. This is the universal type space of Harsanyi (1967-68) and Mertens and Zamir (1985),
allowing players to hold all possible beliefs and higher order beliefs about others￿payo⁄types.3 For
much of this book, we will study a number of classic mechanism problems allowing for all possible
beliefs and higher order beliefs or, equivalently, the universal space.4 By re-working key results in
the literature under this admittedly extreme assumption, we hope to highlight the importance of
informational robustness.
However, we believe that the future of work on robust mechanism design will consist of exploring
type spaces which are intermediate between payo⁄ type spaces and the universal type space. Such
3The universal space is an in￿nite type space, so the language in this section must be extended appropriately to
incorporate it. In the exposition here, we maintain common certainty that each agent is certain of his own payo⁄type
and that preferences are pinned down by a pro￿le of payo⁄ types. These assumptions are not present in the standard
settings where universal type spaces are developed. But the standard construction can be straightforwardly adapted
to incorporate these assumptions - see, e.g., the discussion in section 2.5 of chapter 1 and Heifetz and Neeman (2006).
4As discussed in section 2.5 of chapter 1, there is a small gap between the union of all possible type spaces and the
universal space that arises from "redundant" types. We will ignore this distinction for purposes of this introductory
essay.
9intermediate type spaces embody intermediate common knowledge assumptions about higher order
beliefs. In the remainder of this section, we discuss examples of intermediate type spaces that are
discussed in this book and in the literature.
In some strands of the implementation literature, it is explicitly or implicitly assumed that there
is a true prior p over the payo⁄types which is common knowledge among the agents, but which the
planner does not know. The complete information implementation literature can subsumed in this
speci￿cation. We can represent this as follows. The type space is Ti , ￿(￿) ￿ ￿i; with a typical
element ti = (pi;￿i). The payo⁄ type is de￿ned in the natural way, b ￿i (pi;￿i) , ￿i: The belief type









pi (￿￿i j￿i), if pj = pi for all j 6= i;
0; otherwise.
Choi and Kim (1999) is a representative example of a contribution that explicitly works with this
class of type space in an incomplete information setting. Choi and Kim (1999) is also discussed in
chapter 1, where we show that in a quasi-linear environments with budget balance and two agents,
we can always partially implement allocation rules on the above type spaces, even though it is not
possible to partially implement on all type spaces.
A second classic intermediate type space is the common prior universal type space. In the
universal type space, there is no requirement that agents￿beliefs be derived from some common
prior. But it makes sense to discuss the subset of the universal type space where a common prior
assumption holds. As described formally above, a type space is a common prior type space if
there is a probability measure on the type space such that the players￿beliefs over other players￿
types are conditional beliefs under that common prior. The common prior universal type space
embeds all such common prior type spaces. In this book, the results on partial implementation
(in chapter 1) do not depend on whether the common prior assumption is imposed or not, but
results of full implementation (in chapters 3, 4 and 7) do. Chapter 5 examines the implications for
robust full implementation of restricting attention to common prior type spaces: the results are
unchanged if there are strategic complementarities in the direct mechanism (which is true under
negative interdependence in preferences, i.e., ￿ < 0 in the single good example), but are drastically
changed if there are strategic substitutes (which happens with positive interdependence, i.e., ￿ > 0
in the single good example).
A third natural class of models to study is when many but not all beliefs are consistent with a
given payo⁄ type. In particular, we can assume that there is a benchmark belief corresponding to
10each payo⁄ type and his true belief must be within a small neighborhood of that benchmark belief.
More generally, suppose that if agent i is type ￿i, then his beliefs over the payo⁄ types of others
are contained in a set ￿i (￿i) ￿ ￿(￿￿i). A local robustness condition is the requirement that there
is common knowledge that all types of all agents have beliefs over others￿payo⁄ types within such
set. Thus we ￿x, for each agent i, ￿i : ￿i ! 2￿(￿￿i)￿
?. Now, in any type space, an agent￿ s beliefs
over others￿payo⁄types are implicitly de￿ned and by writing  i (ti) for those beliefs, we have that:









agents i and types ti. If we require each payo⁄type to have only a single possible belief about others￿
payo⁄ types (i.e., each ￿i (￿i) is a singleton), this reduces to the payo⁄ type restriction above. If
we put no restrictions on beliefs (i.e., each ￿i (￿i) = ￿(￿￿i)), then we have the universal type
space. A natural "local robustness" approach is to allow ￿i to consist of a benchmark belief and
a small set of beliefs which are close and versions of this approach have been pursued in a number
of settings. Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon (2009) and Jehiel, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, and Moldovanu
(2010) examine local robust implementation of social choice functions. Artemov, Kunimoto, and
Serrano (2010) examines locally robust (full) virtual implementation of social choice functions. In
chapter 7, we report on the e⁄ect of local robustness considerations in our work on robust virtual
implementation.
These three classes of restrictions are merely representative. Other results in the literature can
be understood as re￿ ecting intermediate classes of type spaces in between payo⁄ type spaces and
the universal type space. Gizatulina and Hellwig (2010) consider all type spaces with the restriction
that agents are informationally small in the sense of McLean and Postlewaite (2002); they show
that notwithstanding a failure of the BDP property highlighted by Neeman (2004), it is possible to
extract almost the full surplus in quasilinear environments. We follow Ledyard (1979) in restricting
attention to full support type spaces in chapter 1 (section 4.2).
Other results in the literature can be understood as allowing richer types spaces, by allowing
payo⁄ perturbations outside the payo⁄ type environment, but then imposing restrictions on beliefs
and higher order beliefs about (perturbed) payo⁄s types. Type spaces which maintain approximate
common knowledge of benchmark type spaces are studied by Chung and Ely (2003) and Aghion,
Fudenberg, Holden, Kunimoto, and Tercieux (2009) as well as in chapter 9. Oury and Tercieux
(2011) can be interpreted as a study of type spaces which are close in the product topology to
11some set of benchmark type spaces. Allowing perturbations outside the speci￿ed payo⁄ type
environment are important in these results.
A ￿nal class of restrictions imposed on type spaces are those labelled "generic". As noted
above, a classic argument that full surplus extraction is possible on ￿nite type spaces relies on a
restriction to "generic" common priors to ensure that the "beliefs determine preferences" property
holds (Cremer and McLean (1988) and Neeman (2004)). Here, genericity is applied to ￿nite payo⁄
type spaces (McAfee and Reny (1992) report an extension to in￿nite payo⁄ type spaces). Since
the payo⁄ type space restriction entails such strong common knowledge assumptions and the BDP
property seems unnatural it is interesting to ask if the BDP property holds generically for richer
type spaces. It is important to note ￿rst of all that the property will fail dramatically if we look at
the (payo⁄type) universal type space: by construction, every combination of payo⁄type and beliefs
about others￿types are possible, and thus BDP fails. Therefore a small literature has examined
whether BDP holds if we look at the common prior universal type space (the full surplus extraction
question is not well posed without the common prior assumption). Unfortunately, there is no
agreement or naturally compelling de￿nition of "typical" or "generic" properties in in￿nite type
spaces. Bergemann and Morris (2001) noted that among the (in￿nite) space of all ￿nite common
prior types within the universal type space, one can always perturb a BDP type by a small amount
in the product topology and get a non-BDP type and conversely perturb the non-BDP type nu a
small amount to get back to a BDP type. For topological notions of genericity, answers depend on
the topology adopted and the topological de￿nition of genericity employed (see results in Dekel,
Fudenberg, and Morris (2006), Barelli (2009), Chen and Xiong (2010), Chen and Xiong (2011)
and Gizatulina and Hellwig (2011)).5 Heifetz and Neeman (2006) report an approach based on
alternative geometric and generalized measure theoretic views of genericity for in￿nite state spaces.
We do not consider restrictions based on "genericity" notions in this book. The work on genericity
is important but complements rather than substitutes for work which highlights transparently the
implicit common knowledge assumptions built into type spaces (such as the BDP property) and
judges the relevance of the type spaces for economic analysis based on the plausibility and relevance
of those assumptions directly.
We conclude this section by emphasizing that the "payo⁄ type" framework described above is
not without loss of generality. In particular, it is assumed that all agents￿utility depends only on a
vector of payo⁄types with the property that each element of the vector is known by each agent. Put
5But see Chen and Xiong (2011) for a problem in the analysis of Barelli (2009).
12di⁄erently, it is assumed that the join of agents￿information fully determines all agents￿preferences.
This assumption is natural for private value environments and captures important interdependent
value environments, but it is restrictive. To see this, consider the single good environment where
each agent i￿ s valuation of the object is given by




We maintain common knowledge that each agent i knows his own payo⁄ type ￿i. What is the
content of this assumption? Summing (1) across agents gives
I X
i=1
















Substituting (2) into (1) gives
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1






































Thus common knowledge of the payo⁄ type environment implicitly entails the extreme sounding
assumption that there there is common knowledge that each agent i knows a particular linear
combination of the agents￿values, as expressed in (3).
We nonetheless maintain the payo⁄type environment throughout the work in this book because
we are focussed on classical questions about implementing social choice functions (and correspon-
dences) which would be impossible if knowing the join of agents￿information is not su¢ cient to
implement the social choice functions. In Bergemann, Morris, and Takahashi (2010), we intro-
duce a language for characterizing interdependent types in terms of revealed preference in strategic
settings. This richer language can be used to explore settings beyond the payo⁄ type environment.
134 Robust Foundations
for Dominant and Ex Post Incentive Compatibility
In chapter 1 (Bergemann and Morris (2005)), we ask whether a planner can design a mechanism
with the property that for any belief and higher order beliefs that the agents may have, there exists
a Bayesian equilibrium of the corresponding incomplete information game where an acceptable
outcome is chosen. If we can ￿nd such a mechanism, then we say that we have a solution to the
robust mechanism design problem. The construction of an ex post incentive compatible mechanism
that delivers an acceptable outcome is clearly su¢ cient, but is it necessary? We call this the ex
post equivalence question.
In the special case of private values, ex post incentive compatibility reduces to dominant strate-
gies incentive compatibility. There has been an extended debate, going back to the very beginnings
of the development of mechanism design, about whether dominant strategies incentive compati-
bility should be required or whether Bayesian incentive compatibility is su¢ cient. Scholars have
long pointed out that - as a practical matter - the planner was unlikely to know the "true prior"
over the type space. Therefore, it would be desirable to have a mechanism which was going to
work independent of the prior. For a private value environment, Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin
(1979), Ledyard (1978) and Ledyard (1979) observed that if a direct mechanism was going to im-
plement a social choice correspondence for every prior on a ￿xed type space, then there must be
dominant strategies implementation. Other scholars pointed out that if the planner did not know
the prior (and the agents do) then we should not restrict attention to direct mechanisms. Rather,
we should allow the mechanism to elicit reports of the true prior from the agents. After all, since
this information is non-exclusive in the sense of Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), this elicitation
will not lead to any incentive problems. A formal application of this folk argument appears in the
work of Choi and Kim (1999).
Chapter 1 provides a resolution of this debate by carefully formalizing - using the type space
language above - what is and is not being assumed about what is common knowledge about beliefs.
This leads to a more nuanced answer to the prior debate about the necessity of dominant strategies
incentive compatibility, as well as the extension to an environment with interdependent values. In
particular, we show that under some circumstances, even if the planner is able to let the mechanism
depend on the agents￿beliefs and higher order beliefs (and thus elicit any knowledge that agents
may have about priors on a ￿xed type space), it is still true that ex post incentive compatibility is
14necessary for Bayesian implementation for all possible beliefs. This is true if the planner is trying
to implement a social choice correspondence which is "separable," a property that is automatically
satis￿ed by social choice functions. But for some multi-valued social choice correspondences, it is
impossible to identify an ex post incentive compatible selection from a social choice correspondence;
but nonetheless, it is possible to ￿nd a mechanism with an acceptable equilibrium on any type space.
We can illustrate both of these points with the single good allocation example.
Let us ￿rst consider the case of a social choice function f (￿) = (q (￿); y (￿)) specifying the
allocation and transfers in our single good environment. For a given (large) type space T and a
















































for all i, t 2 T and t0
i 2 Ti.
We refer here to ￿interim￿rather than ￿Bayesian￿incentive compatibility to emphasize that
the beliefs of agent i, b ￿i (ti)[t￿i], are interim beliefs (without the necessity of a common prior).
Now, intuitively, the larger the type space of each agent, the more incentive constraints there are to
satisfy, and the harder it becomes to implement a given social choice function. As we consider large
type space, that is as we move from the smallest type space, the payo⁄ type space, to the largest
type space, the universal type space, the incentive problems become successively more di¢ cult.
It is then natural to ask whether there is a ￿belief free￿solution concept that can guarantee
that a reporting strategy pro￿le of the agents remains an equilibrium for all possible beliefs and
higher order beliefs. A social choice function f (￿) = (q (￿);y (￿)) is ex post incentive compatible

























Under ￿ex post incentive compatibility￿ each payo⁄ type of each agent has an incentive to
tell the truth if he expects all other agents to tell the truth (whatever his beliefs about others￿
payo⁄ types). Now, given the above de￿nitions, it is apparent that a su¢ cient condition for robust
truthful implementation is that there exists an allocation rule as a function of agents￿payo⁄ types
that is "ex post incentive compatible," i.e., in a payo⁄ type direct mechanism, each agent has an
15incentive to announce his type truthfully whatever his beliefs about others￿payo⁄ types. We show
in chapter 1 that a social choice function f is interim incentive compatible on every type space T
if and only if f is ex post incentive compatible.
The above discussion applied to social choice functions. Does it extend to social choice corre-
spondences, where multiple outcomes are acceptable for the planner for any given pro￿le of payo⁄
types? Suppose that the planner wanted to implement an allocation rule q but did not care about
transfers - i.e., the usual setting in which e¢ cient allocations are studied. Then we would allow for
more general payment rules e y = (e y1;:::; e yI) that could depend on agents￿beliefs and higher order
beliefs, with each e yi : T ! R. Thus we would ask whether for a ￿xed allocation rule q, could we ￿nd




































+ e yi (ti;t￿i)
3
5b ￿i (ti)[t￿i];
for all i, t 2 T and t0
i 2 Ti. By allowing the transfers to depend on the beliefs and higher order
beliefs we weaken the incentive constraints.
Now, the criticism of the classical justi￿cation of dominant strategies discussed above argued
that Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979), Ledyard (1978) and Ledyard (1979) were ￿ awed
because they did not allow transfers to depend on beliefs. However, in this single good environment,
it turns out that allowing transfers to depend on higher order beliefs does not help. In fact, ex
post equivalence continues to hold in this environment and holds more generally in quasi-linear
environments where a planner has a unique acceptable outcome (not specifying transfers) but
does not care about transfers. Such a correspondence is a leading of example of what we call a
"separable" correspondence.
In view of these results, the notion of ex post equilibrium may be viewed as incorporating concern
for robustness to beliefs and higher-order beliefs. This "ex post equivalence" result also suggest
that the robustness requirement imposes a striking simplicity on the implementing mechanism.
The language of large, and larger, type spaces would suggest that we have to solve successively
more di¢ cult incentive problems. After all, as we demand robustness with respect to some or all
beliefs and higher-order beliefs, the number of incentive constraints are increasing. But we make
the problem more di¢ cult, we eventually have to solve the incentive constraints at every pro￿le
￿ exactly, without reference to any expectation over payo⁄ pro￿les. Thus, while the incentive
16constraints per se are demanding, the set of constraints reduces and hence the solution becomes
substantially easier to compute as we only need to verify the incentive constraints at the exact
payo⁄ type pro￿les ￿ rather than the much larger set of possible types t.
But ex post equivalence does not hold in general in the case of general correspondences. In
chapter 1, we give some abstract examples to make this point. In particular, we describe a private
values example with the feature that dominant strategies implementation is impossible but interim
implementation is possible on any type space, and this seems to be the ￿rst example in the literature
noting this possibility. The example points to the fact that interim incentive compatibility can occur
for all type spaces, using mechanisms that elicit and respond to the beliefs of the agents, even if
ex post incentive compatibility is impossible. Here, let us report an interdependent values example
due to Jehiel, Moldovanu, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, and Zame (2006) which makes the same point in the
single good allocation problem.
Suppose now that the payo⁄ type of agent i is given by ￿i = (￿i1;￿i2) 2 [0;1]
2 and that the
value of the object to agent i is then







with " > 0. In the two agent case where ￿ = 0, this example was analyzed by Jehiel et al. (2006).
In this case, the only ex post incentive compatible social choice functions are trivial ones where the
allocation of the object is independent of all agents￿types. Under the assumption that the object
must always be allocated to one of the two agents, this example thus illustrates the general result
of Jehiel et al. (2006) that in generic quasi-linear environments with interdependent values and
multidimensional types, ex post implementation of non-trivial social choice functions is impossible.6
But it is straightforward to see that an almost e¢ cient allocation of the object can be robustly
implemented, since if the object is sold by a second price auction, each agent will have an incentive
to bid within " of ￿i1. This observation can be extended to interdependent values if interdependence
6If there are more than two agents, or if the object is not allocated to either of two agents, then agents are assumed
indi⁄erent between outcomes which violates the genericity condition in the impossibility result of Jehiel et al. (2006).
Bikhchandani (2006) discusses non-trivial ex post incentive compatible allocations that arise if the object need not
be allocated to any agent.
See Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) for analysis of how multidimensional types already limit the possibility of e¢ cient
in standard Bayesian settings and Eso and Maskin (2002) and Jehiel, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, and Moldovanu (2008) for
more on settings with non-trivial ex post implementation with multidimensional type spaces in environments failing
genericity condition of Jehiel et al. (2006).
17is not too large, with 0 < ￿ < 1
I￿1; in this case, then the generalized second price auction would
implement the correspondence of almost e¢ cient allocations. We postpone until our discussion of
chapters 3 and 9 an explanation of why we need ￿ < 1
I￿1 and how much this argument generalizes.
An important class of economic environments where our separability condition fails are quasi-
linear environments where transfers are required to be budget balanced. We show in chapter 1 that
ex post equivalence holds nonetheless in some special cases: if there are two agents (proposition 2)
or if each agent has at most two types (proposition 6). The latter result highlights the importance
of allowing rich type spaces: example 3 shows that we can have partial robust implementation on
all payo⁄ type spaces but not on the universal type space. This environment is important because
it includes the classic public good problem. In general ex post equivalence fails in this environment
(a detailed example was presented in a working paper version of chapter 3, Bergemann and Morris
(2005)). Thus there is not a general equivalence between dominant strategy implementation and
robust implementation for public good problems.
One implication of our results in chapter 1 is that we can distinguish settings where a restriction
to dominant strategies equilibrium (under private values) or ex post equilibrium in mechanism
design problems can or cannot be justi￿ed by informational robustness arguments. Thus Dasgupta
and Maskin (2000) and Perry and Reny (2002) use ex post equilibrium as a solution concept
in studying e¢ cient auctions with interdependent values. This is equivalent to robust partial
implementation.
Our analysis in chapter 1 is limited to asking whether a ￿xed social choice correspondence -
mapping payo⁄ type pro￿les to sets of possible allocations - can or cannot be robustly partially
implemented. Thus we focus on a "yes or no" question. Many of the most interesting questions
involve asking what happens when we consider what is the best mechanism for the universal type
space when we interested in a ￿ner objective, and a number of recent papers have addressed this
question. Chung and Ely (2007) consider the objective of revenue maximization for the seller of a
single object (under the seller￿ s beliefs about agents￿valuations), allowing all possible beliefs and
higher order beliefs of the agents, and show conditions under which the seller cannot do better
than using a dominant strategy mechanism. The best mechanism from the point of view of the
seller would generally allow many outcomes for any given pro￿le of payo⁄ type pro￿les, and will
not in general be separable, and thus the results of chapter 1 do not apply. Smith (2010) and
Boergers and Smith (2011) study the classic problems of public good provision and general social
choice with rich private preferences (i.e., the Gibbard-Satterthwaite question) respectively. They
18identify simple mechanisms that perform better than dominant strategy mechanisms - in the sense
of providing weakly better outcomes on all type spaces and strictly better outcomes on some type
spaces - for each of these two problems. Yamashita (2011) identi￿es a mechanism that performs
better than any dominant strategy mechanism in the classic bilateral trading problem (the notion
of robustness is di⁄erent from that considered in chapter 1 but similar results would hold with our
notion of robustness). Finally, Bierbrauer and Hellwig (2011) combine the informational robustness
approach studied here with a requirement that the social objective be collusion-proof and then
obtain restrictions on the social choice function which satisfy both desiderata.
An interesting question for further analysis is the extent to which the results in chapter 1
continue to hold for more local versions of robustness. Lopomo, Rigotti, and Shannon (2009)
identify settings where local robust implementation of a social choice function is equivalent to ex
post implementation. Jehiel, Meyer-Ter-Vehn, and Moldovanu (2010) give examples illustrating
when this equivalence doesn￿ t hold, but nonetheless show that local robust implementation is a
very strong and, in particular, generically impossible with multidimensional payo⁄ types.
5 Full Implementation
All of the above results are phrased in terms of incentive compatibility, and by use of the revelation
principle, are therefore statements about the existence of a truthtelling equilibrium in the direct
mechanism. The construction of the truthtelling equilibrium of course presumes that when we
verify the truthtelling constraint of agent i that the other agents are telling the truth as well. This
does not address - let alone exclude - the possibility of other equilibria in the direct mechanism;
equilibria in which the agents are not telling the truth, and importantly, in which the social choice
function is not realized.
As private information may enable the agents to coordinate behavior in many di⁄erent ways, the
designer has to be concerned with the fact that there may exist equilibrium behavior by the agents
which does not realize his objective. The notion of full implementation, in contrast to truthful or
partial implementation, addresses this by requiring that every equilibrium in the mechanism attains
the social objective.7
7There is a large literature in economic theory - much of it building on the work of Maskin (1999) - devoted to
the problem of full implementation: When is it the case that there is a mechanism such that every equilibrium
in this mechanism is consistent with a given social choice correspondence? While elegant characterizations of im-
plementability were developed, the "augmented" mechanisms required to achieve positive results were complex and
19In chapter 2, we restrict attention to the solution concept of ex post equilibrium, and ask
what conditions are required for full ex post implementation i.e., all ex post equilibria to deliver
outcomes in the social choice correspondence? In chapter 3, we will move on to ask when is it
possible interim implement a social choice correspondence for all possible higher order beliefs. In
general, the latter is a more stringent requirement. We say that a social choice correspondence that
is interim implementable for all possible type spaces is robustly implementable.
5.1 Ex Post Implementation
Chapter 1 required - for any beliefs and higher order beliefs - an equilibrium that delivered the
right outcome. This required ex post incentive compatibility or - equivalently - that truth-telling is
an ex post equilibrium of the "direct" mechanism where agents just report their payo⁄types. Now,
in chapter 2, we ask: if we take ex post equilibrium as the primitive solution concept, when can we
design a mechanism such that, not only does an ex post equilibrium deliver the right outcome, but
also every ex post equilibrium delivers the right outcome. Thus there is full implementation under
the solution concept of ex post equilibrium - and we call this ex post implementation. We show that
- in addition to ex post incentive compatibility - an ex post monotonicity condition is necessary
and almost su¢ cient. The ex post monotonicity condition neither implies nor is implied by Maskin
monotonicity (necessary and almost su¢ cient for implementation under complete information). By
"almost su¢ cient", we mean su¢ cient in economic environments and after an additional no veto
condition also su¢ cient in general environments.
In a direct mechanism, such as the generalized second price auction, undesirable behavior by
agent i is easiest interpreted as a misreport or deception ￿0. In a direct revelation mechanism, if




rather than f (￿). The notion of ex post monotonicity guarantees that (i) a whistle-blower
(among the agents) will alert the principal of deceptive reporting ￿0 by receiving a reward and (ii)
a whistle-blower will not falsely report a deception.
The social choice function f = (q;y) satis￿es ex post monotonicity if for every ￿;￿0 with f (￿) 6=
seemed particularly implausible. While the possibility of multiple equilibria does seem to be a relevant one in practical
mechanism design problems, particularly in the form of collusion and shill bidding, the theoretical literature so far
has not developed practical insights, with a few recent exceptions such as Ausubel and Milgrom (2005) and Yokoo,
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Proposition 3 in chapter 2 then establishes that the social choice function implied by the gen-
eralized second price auction satis￿es the ex post monotonicity condition. Moreover, due to the
quasi-linearity of the utility function, it also represents an economic environment, and hence can
be fully implemented in an ex post equilibrium, provided there are three or more bidders. In fact,
with interdependent values, or ￿ 6= 0, the implementation can be achieved in the direct mechanism
itself and does not need to make use of an augmented mechanism. In other words, the direct
mechanism is shown to have a unique ex post equilibrium if ￿ 6= 0. This three or more player result
contrasts with the observation of Birulin (2003) that, with only two players, there are a continua
of undominated ex post equilibria in the direct mechanism of the single good allocation problem.
5.2 Robust Implementation in the Direct Mechanism
But can the planner design a mechanism with the property that for any beliefs and higher order
beliefs that the agents may have, every equilibrium has the property that an acceptable outcome
is chosen? We call this "robust implementation" and investigate the possibility of robust imple-
mentation in chapters 3 and 4. We should immediately emphasize that the question of robust
implementation is not the same as the ex post implementation question analyzed in chapter 2: to
rule out bad equilibria in chapter 2, it was enough to make sure you could not construct a "bad" ex
post equilibrium; for robust implementation, we must rule out bad Bayesian, or interim, equilibria
on all type spaces. In chapter 3, we consider a well-behaved environment with payo⁄ type spaces
represented by intervals of the real line and "aggregator single crossing" preferences. In this envi-
ronment, we give a "contraction property" - equivalent to not too much interdependence in types
- and show that if strict ex post incentive compatibility and the contraction property hold, then
robust implementation is possible in the direct mechanism. If either fails, robust implementation
is impossible in any mechanism.
21To describe the results in more detail we return to the (generalized) second price auction. We
start with the private value environment, where it is well-known that the second price auction has
many equilibria in which the agents do not tell the truth, and in consequence the allocation is not
guaranteed to be e¢ cient. The reason is that truthtelling is only a weak best response and hence
just a dominant strategy, but not a strictly dominant strategy. The good news is that we can
easily modify the original auction so that truthful bidding becomes a strictly dominant strategy.
Fix " > 0. Now, with probability 1 ￿ ", let us allocate the object to the highest bidder and have
him pay the second highest bid. With the complementary probability ", let us randomly and
uniformly pick an agent, and allocate the object to that agent with probability bi, a probability
that is proportional to his bid. Thus the "-allocation rule (parameterized by ") is de￿ned by:
q￿￿
i (￿) , (1 ￿ ")q￿






This modi￿ed generalized second price auction is supported by an associated set of (expected)














The transfer rule y￿￿
i (￿) supports truthtelling as an equilibrium in strictly dominant strategies,
that is bi = ￿i forms a strictly dominant strategy in this mechanism. The strictness is established
by making the allocation responsive to the bid of agent i even if agent i is not the highest bidder.
It follows that whatever agent i￿ s beliefs or higher order beliefs about ￿￿i are, he will have a strictly
dominant strategy to set bi = ￿i. In our language, for any " > 0, we can guarantee the robust
implementation of the almost e¢ cient, or "￿e¢ cient allocation rule q￿￿.8
Now consider the case of interdependent values ￿ 6= 0. We can modify the generalized second
price sealed bid auction to turn the ex post equilibrium into a strict ex post equilibrium, just as
we modi￿ed the second price sealed bid auction. We construct the following allocation rule q￿￿
i (￿).
8In related modi￿cations of the second price auction in a private value environment, Plum (1992) considers a
convex combination of a ￿rst-price and a second-price auction (with a small weight on the former) and Blume and
Heidhues (2004) introduce a small reserve price in the second price auction. Either of these modi￿cations render
the equilibrium outcome unique, but in contrast to the present formulation, these modi￿cations do not strengthen
truth-telling from a weakly dominant to a strictly dominant strategy.







and with probability ", we randomly and uniformly pick an agent, and allocate the object to that
agent with probability bi, a probability that is proportional to his bid. In the event that agent i is







Now, in this modi￿cation of the generalized second price auction, the associated transfers can be
































The social choice function in this modi￿ed generalized second price auction is given by a pair
of allocation and transfer functions: f￿￿ (￿) = (q￿￿ (￿);y￿￿ (￿)). The net utility of agent i, given a


























































The net utility function is a linear combination of the e¢ cient allocation rule and the proportional
allocation rule. It is straightforward to compute the best response of each agent i, given a point
belief about the payo⁄ type pro￿le ￿ and reported pro￿le ￿0
￿i of the remaining agents. The best






or upwards, of the other agents:
￿0








From here, it follows that the reports of agent i and agent j are strategic substitutes if ￿ > 0 and
strategic complements if ￿ < 0. For example, with ￿ > 0, if agent j increases his report, then in
response agent i optimally chooses to lower his report.
From (8), we can conclude that truthtelling indeed forms a strict ex post equilibrium. But even
though we have a strict ex post incentive compatible mechanism, we cannot guarantee the robust
23implementation of q￿￿. In fact, we shall now show that the direct mechanism robustly implements





Moreover, no mechanism, whether it is the direct mechanism or an augmented mechanism is able





This necessary and su¢ cient condition for robust implementation should be compared with the
necessary and su¢ cient condition for robust partial implementation, which we earlier showed to
require the single crossing condition, namely
￿ ￿ 1:
As we analyzed truthtelling in the direct mechanism for all possible beliefs and higher-order beliefs,
all we had to do was to guarantee the incentives to reveal the private information, agent by agent,
while presuming truthtelling by other agents. Now, as we seek robust implementation, we cannot
suppose the truthtelling behavior of the other agents but rather have to guarantee it. We shall
obtain this guarantee by identifying restrictions on the rational behavior of each agent, and then
use these restrictions to inductively obtain further restrictions. More formally, we shall analyze the
outcome of the mechanism under rationalizability with incomplete information. An action, which
in the direct mechanism, simply constitutes a reported payo⁄type, is called incomplete information
rationalizable if it survives the process of iteratively elimination of dominated strategies. As ratio-
nalizability with complete information, rationalizability under incomplete information de￿nes an
inductive process: ￿rst suppose that every payo⁄ type ￿i could send any message mi; then, second,
delete those messages mi that are not a best response to some conjecture over pairs of payo⁄ type
and messages (￿￿i;m￿i) of the opponents that have not yet been deleted. The inductive procedure
is then to repeat the second step until convergence is achieved.
We observe that the notion of incomplete information rationalizability is belief free as the
candidate action needs only to be a best response to some beliefs about the other agents actions and
payo⁄ types. We can focus on the notion of incomplete information rationalizability because of the
9The importance of this moderate interdependence condition arose earlier in the work of Chung and Ely (2001)
who showed that it was su¢ cient for implementing the e¢ cient outcome in the unperturbed generalized second price
auction under iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies.
24following epistemic result: a message mi can be sent by an agent with payo⁄ type ￿i in an interim
equilibrium on some type space if and only if mi is "incomplete information rationalizable" for
payo⁄type ￿i. The equivalence between robust and rationalizable implementation is an incomplete
generalization of Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and can be seen as a special case of the incomplete
information results of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003). It illustrates a general point well-known
from the literature on epistemic foundations of game theory: that equilibrium solution concepts
only have bite if we make strong assumptions about type spaces, i.e., we assume small type spaces
where the common prior assumption holds.
We now describe the inductive argument for rationalizability in the direct mechanism for the
single-unit auction. For concreteness, we shall assume here positive interdependence, ￿ > 0, but
all the relevant arguments go through with negative interdependence, after suitably reversing the
signs. In the direct mechanism a message mi is simply a reported payo⁄ type ￿0
i. Each agent i has
some conjecture about the other agents true type pro￿le ￿￿i and and their reported type pro￿le
￿0






2 ￿(￿￿i ￿ ￿￿i).





over his opponents￿types ￿￿i and reports ￿0
￿i in the k￿th step of the inductive procedure. We
denote this set by ￿k





of agent i in step k to be of the
form that type ￿j can only be conjectured to send message ￿0




We initialize the inductive process at step k = 0 by allowing all possible reports ￿0
i (￿i) = [0;1].
In the context of the almost e¢ cient allocation rule f￿￿ (￿) = (q￿￿ (￿);y￿￿ (￿)) and the associated
ex post compatible transfer y￿￿
i (￿), the expected payo⁄ of agent i is quadratic in his report ￿0
i. It
follows that the best response of agent i to a probability one conjecture about his opponents true





, is given by the linear best response ￿0
i:
￿0








Thus if he expects the other agents to underreport their type, i.e. ￿j ￿ ￿0
j > 0, then the best
response of agent i is to correct this by overreporting his type. We notice that the best response
has a self-correcting property. With the correction induced by the reported type ￿0
i in (9), the





















The best response (9) of agent i only corrects the valuation of agent i, the other reported valuation
continue to di⁄er from the true valuations under the best response of agent i. The linear best
response property then leads to a set of best responses ￿k
i (￿i) in step k, which can be characterized

















in step k are determined by the re-







j (￿j); 8j 6= i
o
.
The upper bound ￿
k
(￿i) identi￿es the largest rationalizable report by agent i with payo⁄ type ￿i.
















The largest rationalizable report for agent i, given his payo⁄ type ￿i, arises under the conjecture
that the remaining agents maximally underreport relative to their true payo⁄ type. But the lowest
reported type of payo⁄ type ￿j is given by the lower bound obtained in the preceding step k ￿ 1,
and thus using the lower bound ￿k￿1
j (￿j) from step k ￿ 1 explicitly, we get:
￿
k






Similarly, the lowest possible report of payo⁄ type ￿i, the ￿maximal￿underreport, emerges from
the point conjecture that the remaining agents are ￿maximally￿overreporting relative to their true
type, thus:
￿k







Given the compactness of the payo⁄ type set, in fact ￿i = [0;1], we obtain explicit expressions for
the lower and upper bounds. In step k = 1, the conjectures about the other players are unrestricted,








(￿i) = ￿i + ￿ (I ￿ 1);
and more generally we ￿nd that in step k the upper bound is given by
￿
k
(￿i) = ￿i + (￿ (I ￿ 1))
k ; (10)
and likewise the recursion for the lower bound yields:
￿k (￿i) = ￿i ￿ (￿ (I ￿ 1))
k . (11)
We thus ￿nd that a reported payo⁄ type ￿0
i, di⁄erent from the true type ￿i, can be eliminated for
su¢ ciently large k from the best response set, or
￿0
i 6= ￿i ) ￿0
i = 2 ￿k (￿i);
provided that:




We then have a su¢ cient condition for robust implementation, which requires that the inter-
dependence among the agents is only moderate in this sense of the above inequality. The next
question then is whether the above su¢ cient condition is also a necessary condition for robust
implementation. Indeed, suppose that the parameter of interdependence, ￿, were larger than the





We can use the richness of the possible type space T to identify speci￿c types, in particular speci￿c
belief types, under which the interim expected valuations of any two payo⁄ types ￿i and ￿0
i, with
￿i 6= ￿i, are indistinguishable. Thus suppose that each payo⁄ type ￿i is convinced, i.e. has the













If we now compute the interim expected value of the object for i under the above belief, we ￿nd
that the interim expected value of the object for agent i is in fact independent of ￿i :















(1 + ￿ (I ￿ 1)).
27It then follows immediately that the payo⁄ types cannot be distinguished in the direct mechanism,
as each payo⁄ type ￿i assigns the same expected value to the object given his private information.
We say that the payo⁄ types are indistinguishable, and in fact they are indistinguishable in any,
direct or indirect, mechanism. We have thus established that in the single unit auction, robust










This result has to be contrasted with robust incentive compatibility condition, namely the ex post
incentive compatibility, which required (only) that ￿ < 1.
In chapter 3, we generalize the property of moderate interdependence (13) and refer to it more
generally as a ￿contraction property￿ , as it is suggested by the contraction like property of the lower
and upper bounds, (10) and (11), respectively. We assume that preferences are single crossing with
respect to a one dimensional aggregator of agents￿types. A "deception" speci￿es for each payo⁄
type of each agent, a set of payo⁄ types that might be misreported. Our contraction property
requires that for any deception, there is at least one misreport of one type of one "whistleblowing"
agent for whom the misreports of others will not reverse the sign of the impact of the whistleblower￿ s
misreport on his preferences. The robust implementation result that we established above in the
context of the single unit auction can now be stated for the general environment as follows. Robust
implementation is possible in the direct (or any augmented) mechanism if and only if strict ex post
incentive compatibility and the contraction property hold.
A noteworthy aspect of the above result is that the strict separation between possibility and
impossibility not only holds for the direct mechanism but for any other, possibly augmented mech-
anism. To wit, the literature on implementation frequently uses ￿augmented mechanism￿to obtain
su¢ cient conditions for implementation. Here, the robustness requirement implies that augmented
mechanism, relative to the simple mechanism in the form of the direct mechanism loose their force.
Hence, the more stringent requirements of robust implementation reduce the role of complex and
overly sensitive mechanisms.
The above analysis also demonstrates that while robust implementation is a strong requirement,
it is weaker than dominant strategy implementation. After all, in the environment with interde-
pendent values, a dominant strategy equilibrium does not even exist, nonetheless truthtelling in
28the direct mechanism is an ex post equilibrium, and as we showed is indeed the unique incomplete
information rationalizable outcome.
As we saw in the example of the single unit auction, the ￿contraction property￿had a natural
interpretation in a linear valuation environment. This interpretation remains, even in a nonlinear
utility environment, provided that the aggregator remains linear. For example, a linear aggregator
for each agent i might be of the form:




where each weight ￿ij measures the importance of payo⁄ type j for preference of agent i. In the
case of the linear aggregator, we can form an interaction matrix based on the weights ￿ij across all



























We can then give a generalized version of the moderate interdependence condition in terms of
the interaction matrix ￿. In chapter 3, we show that the interaction matrix has the contraction
property if and only if largest eigenvalue of the interaction matrix is less than 1.
5.3 The Robustness of Robust Implementation
In chapter 9, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn and Morris show that if there is a approximate common
knowledge that we are in an environment close to a strict version of that of chapter 3 (i.e., with one
dimensional interdependent values under an aggregator function and a uniformly strict contraction
property, and uniformly strict ex post incentive compatibility), then the social choice correspon-
dence consisting of almost e¢ cient allocations can be robustly implemented.
This result can be illustrated by the two dimensional perturbation of the single good allocation
problem we discussed in section 4 of this introduction. Thus suppose again that the payo⁄ type of
agent i is given by ￿i = (￿i1;￿i2) 2 [0;1]
2 and that the value of the object to agent i is, as earlier
in (4):








29with " > 0 and ￿ < 1
I￿1. It is an implication of the lower hemicontinuity of rationalizable outcomes
that in the modi￿ed generalized second price auction of chapter 3, types (￿i1;￿i2) will have an
incentive to bid something in the neighborhood of ￿i1. The social choice correspondence of almost
e¢ cient allocations of the private good is therefore almost robustly (fully) implemented.
While chapter 9 delivers a robust full implementation result - by generalizing arguments in
chapter 3 - the purpose of chapter 9 is only to deliver a partial implementation result. This raises
the question of whether it is possible to get partial robust implementation of the almost e¢ cient
allocations (without full robust implementation) without the moderate interdependence condition
of ￿ < 1
I￿1. While the argument presented in chapter 9 relies directly on the arguments of chapter
3, there is an important connection between partial and full implementation identi￿ed by Oury
and Tercieux (2011), which might indicate that there is a strong link between partial and full
implementation. They show that requiring continuous, but partial, implementation in complete or
incomplete information settings implies the necessity of full implementation.
5.4 Robust Implementation in the General Mechanism
Chapter 3 restricted attention to a class of well-behaved environments. In contrast, in chapter 4, we
characterize robust implementation in general environments with general mechanisms. By robust
implementation we mean that every equilibrium on every type space T generates outcomes con-
sistent with the social choice function f. As we seek to identify necessary and su¢ cient conditions
for robust implementation, conceptually there are (at least) two approaches to obtain the condi-
tions. One approach would be to simply look at the interim implementation conditions for every
possible type space T and then try to characterize the intersection or union of these conditions for
all type spaces. But in chapter 4, we focus our analysis on a second, more elegant, approach. We
￿rst establish an equivalence between robust and rationalizable implementation and then derive
the conditions for robust implementation as an implication of rationalizable implementation. The
advantage of the second approach is that after establishing the equivalence, we do not need to
argue in terms of large type spaces, but rather derive the results from a novel argument using the
iterative deletion procedure associated with rationalizability. This equivalence was already used in
chapter 3, but for the arguments in chapter 4 we allow for general (perhaps in￿nite and non-compact
mechanisms), and thus new versions of the equivalence results must be developed.
As suggested by the analysis in the direct mechanism, ex post incentive compatibility and a
robust monotonicity condition are necessary and almost su¢ cient for robust implementation. And,
30in the aggregator single crossing environment of chapter 3, robust monotonicity is equivalent to the
contraction property.
5.5 Rationalizable Implementation
In chapters 3 and 4, we establish necessary and su¢ cient conditions for ￿robust implementation￿in
environments with incomplete information. In particular, we showed that a social choice function f
can be interim (or Bayesian) equilibrium implemented for all possible beliefs and higher order beliefs
if and only if f is implementable under an incomplete information version of rationalizability. These
results prompted us to re￿ne and further develop the rationalizability arguments in environments
with complete information. In chapter 10, we (together with Olivier Tercieux) establish stronger
necessary and su¢ cient conditions than in the incomplete information environment and show that
these conditions are almost equivalent to the Nash equilibrium implementation conditions when
the social choice function is responsive (a social choice function is responsive if distinct states imply
distinct social choices). With respect to the necessary conditions, we strengthen the monotonicity
condition, due to Maskin (1999), from a weak inequality to a strict inequality.
Writing the strict Maskin monotonicity condition in the context of the single good example, we




































A b qi + b yi:
The latter condition requires that if the socially desired alternatives di⁄er in state ￿ and ￿0, then
there must exist an agent i and a reward allocation (b qi; b yi) such that if the true state were ￿0 and
agent i were to expect the other agents to claim that the state is ￿, i could be o⁄ered a reward
(b qi; b yi) that would give him a strict incentive to ￿report￿the deviation of the other agents, but
that the reward y would not tempt him if the true state were in fact ￿. The strengthening of the
monotonicity condition, commonly referred to as Maskin monotonicity, that we require is that the
reward y gives agent i a strict incentive to ￿report truthfully￿if the true state were ￿. In the single
good example, the e¢ cient allocation rule f￿ (￿) = (q￿ (￿);y￿ (￿)) fails Maskin monotonicity and
31thus strict Maskin monotonicity, because the allocation is on the boundary, but nearly e¢ cient
rules such as f￿￿ (￿) = (q￿￿ (￿);y￿￿ (￿)), de￿ned earlier by (5) and (6), are both Maskin monotonic
and strict Maskin monotonic.
Given that we are stating the result in terms of a social choice function, rather than a so-
cial choice correspondence, the notion of full implementation is akin to requiring that the game
(generated by the mechanism) has a unique equilibrium (outcome). The implementation results
in chapter 10 then suggest that su¢ cient conditions to get a unique rationalizable outcome are
similar to those required for a unique Nash equilibrium outcome, provided that the social choice
function is responsive. This is noteworthy as the necessary and almost su¢ cient condition of
Maskin monotonicity is much weaker than the well-known conditions under which there are close
relationships between the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium and the uniqueness of the rationalizable
outcomes, such as supermodular or concave games. The present results indicate the strength of the
implementation approach to reduce the number of equilibria. By using in￿nite message spaces and
stochastic allocations, we strengthen the positive implementation results under Nash equilibrium
to the weaker solution concept of rationalizability.
The techniques by which we identify necessary and almost su¢ cient "monotonicity" conditions
for robust implementation under incomplete information in chapter 4 and rationalizable implemen-
tation under complete information in chapter 10 can be extended to identify necessary and almost
su¢ cient monotonicity conditions for implementation in rationalizable strategies in standard incom-
plete information environments. These conditions are related to but stronger than the Bayesian
monotonicity conditions identi￿ed by Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) and Jackson (1991) for
equilibrium implementation under incomplete information. These conditions are developed and
used in Oury and Tercieux (2011).
5.6 The Role of the Common Prior
In the presentation of the results thus far, we did not place any restrictions on the agents￿beliefs
and higher order beliefs. In chapter 5, we investigate the impact of restricting attention to common
prior type spaces.
We recall that in the single unit auction model, the best response of agent i was of the linear
form:
￿0








If ￿ < 0, the negative informational interdependence gives rise to strategic complementarity in the
32reporting of the payo⁄ types in the direct mechanism. Conversely, positive informational interde-
pendence in agents￿types, or ￿ > 0 gives rise to strategic substitutability in direct mechanism.
The relationship between the informational interdependence and the nature of the strategic
interaction then allows us to o⁄er sharp predictions on the role of the common prior. With strategic
complements, we know that in games of complete information, there is no gap between Nash
equilibrium and rationalizable actions in the sense that there are multiple equilibria if and only if
there are multiple rationalizable actions. This is a well-known result which appeared prominently
in Milgrom and Roberts (1990). Now, with the linear best response property (14), this result
remains true with the appropriate solution concepts for games with incomplete information. In
particular, given the restriction to a common prior type space, the behavior under incomplete
information rationalizability is equivalent to behavior in the incomplete information correlated
equilibrium. In other words, there is a unique Bayes Nash equilibrium if and only if there is unique
incomplete information rationalizable outcome. Thus, provided that we are considering mechanism
with strategic complementarities, whether or not we restrict attention to common prior type spaces
makes no di⁄erence, and in particular the contraction property continues to play the same role as
a necessary and su¢ cient condition for robust implementation, as described earlier.
On the other hand, if we consider environments that give rise to strategic substitutability in
the direct mechanism, then the presence of a common prior facilitates the robust implementation.
Here, it is possible to robustly implement the allocation problem, even if the contraction property




< ￿ < 1;
and still guarantee robust implementation in the direct mechanism if we restrict attention to type
spaces satisfying the common prior assumption. This leads to the following result in chapter 5. If
the reports are strategic complements, then robust implementation with a common prior implies
robust implementation without a common prior. If the reports are strategic substitutes, then robust
implementation with a common prior fails to imply robust implementation without a common prior.
5.7 Dynamic Mechanisms
All the results discussed so far have dealt with static mechanisms. In chapter 6, we analyze the
modi￿ed generalized second price auction in a dynamic mechanism. We consider the ascending (or
English) auction in a complete information environment. We ask whether the sequential mechanism
33o⁄ers advantages relative to the static, direct revelation, mechanism in terms of achieving robust
implementation. The advantage of the sequential mechanism is the ability to reveal and communi-
cate private information in the course of the mechanism. The revelation of private information can
decrease the uncertainty faced by the bidders and ultimately improve the ￿nal allocation o⁄ered
by the mechanism. In auctions, the source of the uncertainty can either be payo⁄ uncertainty (un-
certainty about payo⁄ relevant information) or strategic uncertainty (uncertainty about the bids of
the other agents). We show that the e¢ cient outcome is fully implemented even when
1
I ￿ 1
< ￿ < 1.
Recall that in this setting, we know that full robust implementation (with incomplete information)
is not possible under any mechanism and that full implementation does not occur in this direct
mechanism even with complete information. Thus we show that in at least some settings, sequential
re￿nements help achieve full implementation.
This result is in the spirit of the classical results of Moore and Repullo (1988) showing the
possibility of full implementation of social choice functions even when Maskin monotonicity fails, if
subgame perfection is used as a solution concept within the dynamic mechanism. Aghion, Fuden-
berg, Holden, Kunimoto, and Tercieux (2009) show that full implementation is no longer possible,
even under subgame perfection, if the mechanism is required to work also for types close to complete
information.
More closely related to our work in chapter 6, Mueller (2009) and Penta (2011) examine the
robustness of dynamic mechanisms in environments with incomplete information. The results are
sensitive to the sequential re￿nement used in this context, with Mueller (2009) obtaining very
permissive results with a stronger re￿nement and Penta (2011) getting less permissive results with
a weaker re￿nement. Our approach uses a version of Penta￿ s weaker re￿nement, but results in Penta
(2011) suggest that our positive results in chapter 6 do rely heavily on the complete information
assumption.
5.8 Virtual Implementation
In complete as well as in incomplete information settings, the relaxation from "exact" implemen-
tation to "virtual" implementation leads to a signi￿cant weakening of the necessary conditions for
implementation. Virtual implementation, as initially de￿ned by Matsushima (1988) and Abreu
and Sen (1991), requires that the social choice function arises with probability arbitrarily close to
341, but not necessarily equal to 1. In chapter 7, we characterize robust virtual implementation in
general environments with well-behaved, ￿nite or compact, mechanisms. We show that ex post
incentive compatibility and a robust measurability condition are necessary and almost su¢ cient
for robust virtual implementation. Robust measurability can also be naturally interpreted as a
restriction on the amount of interdependence of agents￿types. But it neither implies nor is implied
by robust monotonicity. However, in the aggregator environment of chapter 3, robust measurability
and robust monotonicity are both equivalent to the contraction property and the only impact of
relaxing "exact" to "virtual" robust implementation is the relaxation from strict ex post incentive
compatibility in chapter 3 to weak ex post incentive compatibility.
With respect to our leading example, the single unit auction, the transition from the generalized
second price auction to the modi￿ed second price auction, can now be interpreted as the virtual
implementation of the generalized second price auction. After all, in the modi￿ed generalized second
price auction, the allocation of the generalized second price auction is only chosen with probability
1￿", for some " > 0. The key result in chapter 7 is a characterization of when two payo⁄types are
strategically distinguishable in the sense that they can be guaranteed to behave di⁄erently in some
mechanism. The condition of robust measurability now requires that strategically indistinguishable
types are treated the same by the social choice function.
We now provide an exact characterization of strategic distinguishability in the context of the
single-unit auction. If we have sets of payo⁄ types, ￿1 and ￿2, of agents 1 and 2, respectively, we
say that the set ￿2 separates the set ￿1 if knowing agent 1￿ s preferences and knowing that agent
1 is sure that agent 2￿ s type is in ￿2, we can rule out at least some payo⁄ type of agent 1 in ￿1.
Now consider an iterative process where we start, for each agent, with all subsets of his payo⁄
type set, namely the power set of ￿1, 2￿1, and - at each stage - delete subsets of payo⁄ types that
are separated by every remaining subset of types of his opponents. A pair of types are said to be
pairwise inseparable if the set consisting of that pair of types survives this process. We show that
two types are strategically indistinguishable if and only if they are pairwise inseparable.
If there are private values and every payo⁄ type is value distinguished, then every pair of types
will be pairwise separable and thus strategically distinguishable. Thus strategic indistinguishability
arises only when the degree of interdependence in preferences is large. We can illustrate this within
the context of our single-unit auction example. As the utility function ui (￿) is linear in the monetary
transfer for all types and all agents, the separability must come from di⁄erent valuations of the
object. For given type set pro￿le ￿￿i of all agents but i, we can identify the set of possible






























where we write with minor abuse of notation, min￿j and max￿j to identify the smallest and
largest real number in the set ￿j, respectively. Now we say that ￿￿i separates ￿i if and only if
\
￿i2￿i
Vi (￿i;￿￿i) = ?.
By the linearity of the valuation, this is equivalent to requiring that
Vi (max￿i;￿￿i) \ Vi (min￿i;￿￿i) = ?.








We can rewrite the inequality as




Thus ￿￿i separates ￿i if and only if the di⁄erence between the smallest and the largest element in
the set ￿i is larger than the weighted sum of the di⁄erences of the smallest and the largest element
in the remaining sets ￿j for all j 6= i. Conversely, ￿￿i does not separate ￿i if the above inequality
is reversed, i.e.,
max￿i ￿ min￿i ￿ ￿
X
j6=i
(max￿j ￿ min￿j). (16)
We write ￿k
i for the kth level inseparable sets of player i, and we have:
￿0
i = 2￿i,


















Now, we can identify the k ￿th level inseparable set for the single unit auction example as follows.
































Thus if ￿ (I ￿ 1) < 1, ￿￿
i consists of singletons, ￿￿
i = (f￿ig)￿i2[0;1], while if ￿ (I ￿ 1) ￿ 1, ￿￿
i consists
of all subsets, ￿￿
i = 2[0;1]. In consequence, we ￿nd that if ￿ < 1
I￿1, so that interdependence is not
too large, every distinct pair of types are pairwise separable. If on the other hand, ￿ ￿ 1
I￿1, then
every pair of payo⁄ types are pairwise inseparable.
While our su¢ ciency argument for robust virtual implementation builds on Abreu and Mat-
sushima (1992), the interpretation of our results ends up being rather di⁄erent. In a standard
Bayesian setting, the measurability condition of Abreu and Matsushima (1992) is arguably a weak
technical requirement. As a result, the ￿bottom line￿of the virtual implementation literature has
been that full implementation, i.e., getting rid of undesirable equilibria, does not impose any sub-
stantive constraints beyond incentive compatibility, i.e., the existence of desirable equilibria. By
requiring the more demanding, but more plausible, robust formulation of incomplete information,
we end up with a condition that is substantive (imposing signi￿cantly more structure in interde-
pendent value environments than incentive compatibility) and easily interpretable.
A conclusion that emerges from the chapters 3, 4 and 7, and that we developed here within
the single good example, is that we keep ending up with the same moderate interdependence
condition, ￿ < 1
I￿1, as a necessary and su¢ cient condition for full implementation. In general,
though, the robust monotonicity condition of chapter 4 (and its contraction property version in
chapter 3) neither implies nor is implied by robust measurability, as we show by examples in chapter
7. Kunimoto and Serrano (2010) present a detailed discussion of these conditions and develop an
argument as to why robust monotonicity should be seen as the weaker of the independent conditions.
Artemov, Kunimoto, and Serrano (2010) characterize an analogue of robust measurability under
local robustness conditions and argue that it is a weak condition.
37In section 6.3 of chapter 7, we do brie￿ y re-consider the single good example under a local
robustness condition: suppose that in the single good example, each agent puts probability mass
1 ￿ ￿ on a uniform distribution over the payo⁄ types of other agents, but that ￿ probability may
be allocated to any beliefs. Thus if ￿ = 0, we have a standard payo⁄ type space with independent
types and if ￿ = 1 we have the universal type space that is the focus of this book. We show that
virtual implementation is possible if and only if ￿￿ < 1
I￿1. In this sense, at least within the single
good example, the path to global robustness through local robustness is smooth.
6 Open Issues
In most of the work discussed, we de￿ned the allocation problem in terms of social choice function or
correspondence, which speci￿ed for each pro￿le of payo⁄ types ￿ a speci￿c allocation. Importantly,
the social choice function was de￿ned independent of the beliefs of the agents and/or the principal.
While this speci￿cation accommodates many allocation problems, in particular the socially e¢ cient
allocation, it cannot represent others, such as revenue maximizing allocations. Here, the allocation
rule typically depends on the beliefs of the principal or the agents, as the optimal allocation relies
on trading o⁄ outcomes across di⁄erent states, where the trade-o⁄s have to be evaluated with the
likelihood of each state, and hence requires the use of beliefs. In chapter 11, Karl Schlag and
Bergemann suggest a possible approach to analyze revenue maximization problems in the absence
of prior beliefs. They consider the classic monopoly problem of a seller who o⁄ers a homogenous
good to buyers with privately known valuations. In the absence of a (common) prior, we require
the seller to minimize his expected regret through an optimal pricing policy. The resulting pricing
policy hedges against the uncertainty with respect to the true distribution through a uniquely
determined randomized pricing policy. And while the resulting mixed strategy can be interpreted
as the optimal pricing rule against a speci￿c prior distribution, a random pricing policy is never the
uniquely optimal policy given a known prior. In fact, against a known prior, there always exists
an optimal pricing rule that is deterministic. In ongoing work, Bergemann and Schlag (2008b)
consider the problem of optimal pricing when the seller has some prior information. In this version
of the problem the seller knows that demand will be in a small neighborhood of a given model
distribution. We characterized the optimal pricing policy under two distinct, but related, decision
criteria with multiple priors: (i) maximin expected utility and (ii) minimax expected regret. The
resulting model can be interpreted as a locally robust version of the classic problem of optimal
38monopoly pricing.
A second, and related, limitation of the present work is that we were mostly concerned with
"global" notions of robustness. We allowed for any beliefs and higher order beliefs consistent
with the existing model. It would be of interest to look at "local" notions of robustness, where
more limited perturbation of the types and information structures are considered. For example, in
ongoing work, Bergemann and Morris (2011c), we consider games with incomplete information and
ask what predictions can be made with the knowledge of a common prior over the payo⁄ relevant
states, and importantly in the absence of any additional information about the private information,
the type space, of the agents. Thus, we consider a common prior about the relevant state, but are
agnostic with respect to the beliefs and higher-order beliefs of the agents. In Bergemann and Morris
(2011c), we use the structure of quadratic payo⁄s, and hence linear best response to analyze the
set of possible equilibrium distributions in terms of moment restrictions. In Bergemann and Morris
(2011a), we develop the associated equilibrium concept, which we refer to as Bayes correlated
equilibrium for general ￿nite action, ￿nite agent games with incomplete information and establish
how the equilibrium set depends on and changes with the private information of the agents.
A similar approach would seem to have promise in the realm of mechanism design as well.
For example, in a ￿rst price auction, one might attempt to ￿nd the set of possible equilibrium
bid distributions that are generated by all information structures consistent with a given common
prior over valuations. Likewise, one might investigate, the nature of the optimal auction when the
principal has only limited information about the nature of the private information of the agents.
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